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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an intermediate appeal from the Honorable
Judge Martin M. Larsen granting plaintiff a new trial
from a judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff "no cause of action" (R. 229-230). The action was
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Title
45, Section 51 U. C. A. for injury allegedly sustained by
plaintiff at Soldier Summit on December 21, 1951. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint the following grounds of negligence:
"1. That the defendant failed and neglected
to use reasonable care to furnish plaintiff a reason-
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ably safe place in which to work in this: that the
said defendant in the clearing of the snow from the
tracks at Soldier Summit and in the vicinity where
plaintiff was injured failed to clean the tracks a
sufficient distance from the track in order that
persons riding on the stirrups or side of the engine
or cars could do so in safety and without having
the said snow come in contact with them, thereby
causing them to fall to the ground and be injured.
"2. That the defendant negligently failed to
have sufficient clearance between the side of its
engine and the snowbank on the right side of said
eastbound engine.
"3. That the defendant negligently failed to
warn its employees or to place any warning sign
that there was insufficient clearance between the
cars or engine and the snowbank at the side of the
tracks at Soldier Summit where the plaintiff was
injured" (Italics ours).
Inasmuch as this is an intermediate appeal relating
only to two instructions given by the Court the facts
will be outlined only briefly. Plaintiff while working
as a trainman in the yards at Soldier Summit in the
early morning hours of December 21, 1951 was allegedly
injured. The weather on that occasion was extremely cold
and wintry and there had been many severe storms during that month. At the time of the accident it was snowing. This snow had been drifted by the wind which had
been blowing during the night. Considerable testimony
was introduced showing that the winter of 1951 and 1952
had been unusually severe and that the Railroad. had had
great difficulty in keeping its tracks at Soldier Summit
cleared (R. 17). Cleaning crews were working day and
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night to keep the main line and the passing lines cleared of
snow and ice (R. 117). The track upon which the train was
operating on which plaintiff was working at the time of the
accident had been cleared of snow in the usual and customary manner a few hours prior to the accident. Railroad
snow crews were working upon other tracks in the vicinity
of Soldier Summit at the time the accident occurred (R .
118-119).
During the month of December the Railroad had hired
many additional employees to aid in keeping the tracks
clear of snow and ice (R. 116). The freight train with
which plaintiff was working consisted of approximately
80 cars. At the time of the incident complained of it was
moving east into the passing track at Soldier Summit to
allow a westbound train to pass on the mainline track.
Soldier Summit is one of the highest points on the defendant
Railroad. In movements east from the Summit trains move
down grade. It was therefore necessary that retainers on
the cars be set at Soldier Summit to control the speed of
the train in its down grade movement (R. 14).
Plaintiff testified that while he was standing on the
side ladder of the engine waiting to step down from the
engine for the purpose of setting retainers on the cars the
snow alongside the tracks pushed up against his feet causing him to fall from the engine and sustain his injuries
(R. 17). He testified that there was an area of 100 feet in
length at the point where this incident occurred where there
was a close clearance between the snowbanks and the sides
of the cars.
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There was no evidence that the defendant Railroad
had actual knowledge of the alleged close clearance between the snowbanks and the sides of the cars. Furthermore the testimony relative to the amount of clearance was
conflicting. The testimony failed to show whether the snow
which had created the alleged close clearance had drifted
or fallen, or for that matter when it had drifted or fallen
in said place. As herein indicated it was undisputed that
the track where the accident occurred had been cleared of
snow a few hours prior to the accident. In its instructions
to the jury the trial court gave instructions 9 and 10,
which instructions are as follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 9
"In order to find that the railroad was negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work in this
case, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
"(1) The railroad knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that
there was snow or other substance near
the tracks at the point of the accident,
which snow or substance created a situaation which was not a reasonably safe place
for railroad workers to work; and
"(2) That the railroad had a reasonably sufficient period of time within which to eliminate said snow or substance and could
reasonably have eliminated it, and failed
to do so."
"INSTRUCTION NO. 10
"In order to find that the railroad was negligent in failing to warn plaintiff by warning sign or
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otherwise of the alleged insufficient clearance between the cars or engine and the snow-bank at the
side of the tracks near the point of the accident,
you must find that
"(1) There was in fact an insufficient clearance
between the said cars or engine and the
snow-bank; and
"(2) That the railroad knew, or, by the exercise
of reasonable care, should have known of
said insufficient clearance and should reasonably have known that it created an
appreciable risk of harm to railroad workers; and
"(3) That the railroad had a reasonable opportunity to warn plaintiff of said condition, and failed to do so."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
Railroad and against the plaintiff "no cause of action" and
judgment was entered thereon. Thereafter a Motion for
New Trial was made by plaintiff in which plaintiff claimed
that Instructions No. 9 and 10 were erroneous. After argument on said Motion for New Trial the trial court took the
matter under advisement and thereafter granted plaintiff a
new trial expressly basing its decision upon the ground set
forth in the memorandum decision found at page 229-230
of the record. In this decision the Court isolated the
grounds upon which it granted the Motion for a New Trial
for the very purpose of giving this Court an opportunity to
review by intermediate appeal. The Honorable Trial Judge
in his written opinion in holding that Instructions No. 9
and 10 were erroneous said:
"Since this case was heard, the Supreme Court
in this state has handed down his decision in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

case of Butz vs. Railroad Company,~- P. 2d. - (not yet in Utah Reports). Under the language in
that opinion, the Court concludes that Instructions
9 and 10 in the Court's Charge to the Jury were
erroneous, and, for that reason and upon that
ground, plaintiff's motion for a new trial is granted, the judgment heretofore vacated and set aside,
and the cause remanded to the trial calendar for retrial."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The .Trial Court erred in granting a Motion for New
'.rrial on the grounds that Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 were
erroneously given for the reason that said instructions correctly state the law applicable to the facts in the instant
case.
ARGUMENT
The Trial Court specifically stated that because of
Butz vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, _ _ Utah _ ,
(233 P. 2d 332,) which was decided after the instant case
had been tried, ·he felt that instructions Nos. 9 and 10 had
been erroneously given.
In the Butz case, supra, the facts were briefly as follows:
Plaintiff was injured while working as a switchman
on the baggage trucks of the Union Pacific Railroad Company. While riding on the side of a car he struck his back
against a baggage truck which had been left so close to the
tracks that it created a hazardous condition. It was assumed in the court's opinion that the baggage truck had not
been left in a dangerous position by agents of the Railroad
Company but had been so left by third parties.
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The Trial Court granted a non-suit apparently on the
ground that there was no evidence showing that the defendant Railroad was negligent and probably on the further
ground that the evidence showed as a matter of law that
the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was his own
contributory negligence. Justice Crockett, writing for a
majority of the Court consisting of Justices Wade and McDonough, held that the case should have been submitted to
the jury on the question of defendant's negligence. The
Court said:
"There is abundant authority that a defendant
employer is charged with responsibility for conditions of danger upon the property of others of which
it either has actual knowledge or is charged with
constructive knowledge because the hazard is of such
a nature and has existed for sufficient time that in
the exercise of reasonable care the employer should
have discovered it" (Italics ours).
The Court further said :
"The test is not whether afterward one may see
a way that the injury could have been prevented but
whether the Railroad in the exercise of ordinary
prudence and care should have reasonably forseen
the likelihood of injury. Under the circumstances
in the instant case, this is a matter upon which
reasonable minds could well differ" (Italics ours).
The Court then quoted from Justice Black in the case
of Wilkerson vs. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413,
93 L. Ed. 497, wherein Justice Black said:

"* * * respondent's argument held * * *
that the Federal Act does not make the Railroad an
absolute insurer * * * that proposition is cor-
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rect * * * the Act imposes liability only for
negligent injuries. * * * But the issue of negligence is one for juries to determine * * *"
(Italics ours) .
Justices Wolfe and Lattimer dissented on the grounds
that the non-suit was properly granted.
We have no quarrel with the Butz case. It simply holds
that the Trial Court should have permitted the case to go
to the jury on the question of whether or not the defendant
Railroad was negligent in failing to provide the plaintiff
with a safe place to work.
There is considerable difference between the Butz case
and the instant case. The Butz case was not submitted to
the jury; the instant case was submitted. The Court did
not hold in the Butz case that the Union Pacific Railroad
company had an absolute duty to furnish plaintiff with a
safe place to work; it held that a jury should be permitted to
find whether or not the Railroad negligently failed to provide a safe place to work. In the case at bar the jury was instructed that they could not so find unless the Railroad
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known of the dangerous condition allegedly existing.
If the Butz case holds that a defendant is chargeable
with something more than the exercise of reasonable care
then the Butz case has established a rule of law of absolute
liability. We are sure this was not the intention of this
Honorable Court nor do we think a fair reading of that
case so indicates.

As herein indicated, evidence was introduced from
which a jury could have found that snow alongside the
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track had not been removed near a battery box stand for the
reason that the snowplow blade had to be pulled up at that
point to avoid striking and damaging the box. Other evidence indicated that newly drifted snow was accumulating
alongside the track. The undisputed physical evidence showed that plaintiff could not have encountered the snow left
remaining near the battery box. This was established by
the testimony of plaintiff, who stated that the battery box
was approximately 25 to 30 car lengths from the point
where the passing track joins the mainline at the east end
of the yard (R. 41). Other witnesses testified that the
battery box was more than 25 to 30 car lengths from the
switch point. Mr. Hales, called by plaintiff placed it 50
or 60 car lengths away (R. 82). The physical fact, shown
by actual measurement is that the battery box was 1716
feet west' of the dwarf signal which is at the point where
the east end of the passing track joins the mainline (R.
129).
The significance of this testimony is that the plaintiff
testified that when the train came to a stop he was on the
ground approximately 40 feet west of the tender (R. 46).
Mr. Williams, the engineer, testified that the train in
question consisted of an engine and tender on the head end
pulling 88 mine empties followed by a caboose and helper
engine. In all the train consisted of 92 cars, including the
engines (R. 162). The time table shows that the passing
track holds 105 cars (R. 129). The engineer further testified that it is customary to pull the train all the way into
the passing track so that the rear end would not foul
the main line (R. 162). Following this custom he pulled
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the engine all the way into the track until he reached the
dwarf switch at the east end of the yard before he came
to a stop (R. 162). This was almost a quarter of a mile
from the battery box. How then could plaintiff have struck
snow near this box? We are confident that the jury concluded he did not. The only other snow near enough to the
track to constitute a possible hazard was snow that may
have accumulated by drifting along side the tracks in the
early morning hours.
The plaintiff testified that while he was standing in
the snow and wind on the step of the engine all he could
see was flying snow and steam ( R. 63) . He did not know
whether there was one inch clearance or three feet (R. 63).
The jury undoubtedly found that if plaintiff's foot encountered snow, as he testified, it was newly drifted snow
that had accumulated during the early morning hours along
the side of the track. The court by instructions Nos. 9 and
10 in effect advised the jury that if this occurred the Railroad would not be liable unless the Railroad knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known that
such drifts existed. If the case was to be submitted on
the pleaded issue of negligence what other instruction could
the court have given? If the court had failed to so instruct
the jury could have found the Railroad liable simply because plaintiff's foot caught in a snowdrift. Such finding
would be based on liability without fault unless the Railroad knew or should have known of the hazard so that it
could have been prevented.
It will be observed that the plaintiff alleged in his
complaint certain grounds of negligence which had been set
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out herein. In every instance the plaintiff alleges that the
things which defendant did were done negligently. N egligence means the doing or the failure to do what an ordinary
reasonable man would not do or fail to do.
We submit that there was clearly competent evidence
from which the jury could very reasonably have found that
the defendant did not know and could not reasonably have
known of the existence of an alleged close clearance and the
defendant had no reasonable opportunity to correct this
condition or warn the plaintiff about it. We therefore
believe that the Court's instructions correctly set forth defendant's theory of the case and were based upon the competent evidence supporting such theory.
The Courts have consistently held that the plaintiff must prove that the Railroad either had actual
knowlege of the alleged unsafe condition or that in the
exercise of reasonable care the Railroad should have known
of it. This we believe is exactly what was held in the Butz
case, supra.
In Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 940, 69 S. Ct.
413, U. S. Supreme Court reiterated the rule that liability
in Federal Employers' Liability case is based on fault.
Justice Douglas, in a special concurring opinion, said :
"the basis of liability under the act is and remains
negligence. Judges will not always agree as to what
facts are necessary to establish negligence."
Justice Black, speaking for the majority of the Court,
said:
"There are some who think that recent decisions
of this Court which have required submission of
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negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees.' * * * This assumption, that railroads
are made insurers where the issue of negligence is
left to the jury, is inadmissible."
The Federal Courts, in determining this question, have
uniformly held that a railroad is responsible under the act
for acts of negligence only where the act or omission is
either known or something that the railroad in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known. Thus in 0' Mara v.
Penn. R. R. Co., 6 Cir. 95 F. 2d 762; and Hatton v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 1 Cir. 261 Fed. 667,
and as quoted in Kloetzer v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 95 N. E.
2d 502; 341 Ill. App. 478, it is held:
"Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
a railroad company may be responsible to an employee for failing to provide a safe place to work,
only if the company knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known of the unsafe
condition."
Other federal cases which so held are:

Southern R. Co. v. Stewart, 115 F. 2d 317;
Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 114 F.
2d 69;
Saunders v. Longview, D. & N. R. Co., 296 P.
835.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court's decision granting a new trial as
herein indicated was based entirely on the court's conclusion that the Butz case had ruled that the Railroad could
be held liable even though it did not know of the existence
of the alleged hazard and even though it could not, in the
exercise of reasonable care, have known of its existence.
We believe, and have tried to show, that this Honorable
Court did not so hold in the Butz case. All this Court held
was that a jury should have been permitted to find whether
or not the Union Pacific Railroad knew or should have
known that a hazard existed by reason of close clearance
caused by baggage trucks being left near the tracks. For
these reasons we respectfully submit that the trial court's
decision granting a new trial should be reversed and the
jury's verdict of "no cause of action" be permitted to stand.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD A. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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